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THE SUPREME COURT AS A POLITICAL
INSTITUTION
By EARr. LATHAM*

C

I

on American constitutional law has long been
the almost preclusive specialty of lawyers and teachers of
politics who imitate lawyers in the classroom. In fact, the lawyer's
approach has been so pervasive that it is sometimes difficult to
discern the essential nature of that branch of the "law" under the
rituals and trappings with which the custom of the market has
invested the legal trade. Legal ceremonies and habits, in short, have
covered the substantive nature of American constitutional law in
a garb which marks the form but conceals the fact. It is the assumption of this paper that American constitutional law is primarily
political theory dressed in lawyers language, and that the justices
of the United States Supreme Court, when they act in constitutional
law cases, deal with juristic theories of politics.
In one sense, all law that gets itself enforced through public
secular institutions (policemen and judges) is public law, for
enforcement by private institutions would be the rule of the vendetta, lynch law, or the law of the beer barons of the 1920's. In the
manner of speaking of lawyers, however, public law is more commonly supposed to concern itself with the activities of public institutions, in their relations with each other and, collectively, as
government, in their relations to the people. So considered, public
law (including American constitutional law) is concerned with
politics in its broadest sense, the subject matter of which is power
OMMENTARY

in human relations-its origin, forms, accumulation, administration,

obsolescence, and control within the frame of accepted norms of
*Professor of Political Science. University of Minnesota.
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social ethics. Theories of public law are necessarily, therefore,
theories of politics, and American constitutional law is a body of
juristic theories of American politics.
juristic theories of politics are to be distinguished from sociological theories of politics say, by the manner of their expression
and the focus of their concern. Juristic theories of politics are
propositions of political theory put into terms of rights and obligations. They are to be further distinguished from ethical propositions of the same order by the institutional context within which
they function. The speech of lawyers makes a careful distinction
between "legal" duties and "moral" duties, with the somewhat
cynical implication that the latter are of little consequence because
the policeman won't arrest you, and the judge won't fine you, if you
violate them. One consequence of this preoccupation with the instruments and institutions of law administration is a tendency to
define law in terms of such instruments and institutions. Law
becomes that pattern of rules which the public authorities will enforce. If true, it should follow, perhaps, that whatever does not
get itself enforced is not law, although the normative values of the
law would disappear if this were so.
Despite the teapot tempest over legal realism in the last decade
and a half (now reduced to a simmer) the source of this law
cannot be merely the behavior of the judges, but must be the
behavior of the people as well. The reduction of law to the ignobility
of a judicial tic is a melancholy development out of the confusion
of the times. Not the judges alone, but the entire community
participates in the making of law-presidents, legislators, administrators of public agencies, organized groups and unorganized
groups, churches, unions, lodges, business enterprises, professional
societies and social clubs, farmers, laborers and captains of industry, preachers, teachers, prelates and politicians, bureaucrats,
policemen, clerks, and lawyers.
The pattern of the public law at any given instant of time is the
balance of the relations existing among these various and numerous
elements of the society. Where conflict is absent (or slight) relations may be said to be stable, and agreement on common rules
prevails. Where serious conflict exists, relations are in turmoil
and the rules themselves are exposed to pressure for change. A
German writer has remarked that developments in constitutional
and administrative law may be looked for precisely when some
special interest is seeking to arrogate to itself the signs and seals of
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the public interest. The life of the law is indeed experience, and not
logic, as Holmes once observed, but it is the experience of the
society through which the dynamism of social change works as a
ferment. judges are but one of the voices through which this experience finds tongue and expression, yet because of the strategic
-position in the American political process won for the Supreme
Court by John Marshall, the utterances of the justices of the
Supreme Court have assumed a disproportionate weight in the
shifting balance of these social forces.
Each generation necessarily defines the basic distribution of
public powers for itself, and it is the function of the political apparatus of society to give expression to this decision, including the
Court as a political institution. What we call the "Constitution of
the United States" is the prevailing sense that men now have of
the proper distribution of political powers, and of the nature of
the forms and methods necessary to achieve the ends for which
such powers were distributed. The vigor of this Constitution is
not in the niinds of men long dead but in the conceptions of the
living.
The following pages discuss the role of the Supreme Court as
a-political institution, not as a trafficker in party votes and electoral stratagems, but as one of the principal holders of public
power, responsible to no constituency, and strategically located to
slow down or divert those great pivotal movements in American
society when the weight of political power shifts from one point
and plane to another. As one of the institutional holders of public
power, th6 Court has inevitably been involved with juristic theories
of politics in three major areas of doctrine: federalism; the priority
of the estates; and the separation of powers. The object of this
essay is to comment on the way in which the Court in these three
areas of doctrine has wielded its power to slow down, guide, and
divert the political adjustments of an evolving society in movement
from one tentative balance to the next, and to consider the logic
of this form of political control and influence within the context
of a democratic system.
II
The use of the power of the Supreme Court as a political institution may be observed in the role it played in interpreting the
Federal system in two critical periods: Marshall's time and the
years directly after the Civil War. In the first, the Court defined
a broad area of Federal competence and put constitutional fences
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of verbal wire around it; in the second, the Court sought to restate the role of the States as entities of the Federal system and to set
metes and bounds to Federal encroachment. In both instances, the
Court intervened in a popular struggle, in one case succoring a
party fatally defeated at the polls and in the other, frustrating the
aims of the victor; and by the shrewd exposition and interpretation
of its own doctrines perpetuated its views about the nature of the
Federal union and, incidentally, extended its own dominion.
In the early 1800's, there were other views of the nature of the
Federal union than the Federalist conception of Chief Justice Marshall equally consistent with the language of the Constitution and,
in some cases, better supported by the electorate.' The debates of
the Federal Convention were secret and not made known through
Madison's notes until 1840 so that argument on the basis of what
the Framers intended was speculative at best. Nor did Marshall
often attempt to use such argument, since there ,vas no particular
force in it; those who ratified the Constitution presumed that their
understanding of that for which they voted would be equally valid
in fixing the meaning of the document. The Framers after all were
merely the draftsmen of a document whose meaning could as well
(better) be fixed by the common understanding of those who
adopted it as by the undisclosed intentions of those who had written
the words.
In fixing the Federalist conception in the law of the land,
Marshall laid down the pivotal doctrine that the Federal Government alone could define the competence of the Federal Government;
moreover, in defining its competence it need not confine itself to
the strict constructions of meager words. In such classic cases as
Cohens v. Virginia,2 McCullough v. Maryland,3 and Fletcher v.
Peck 4 Chief Justice Marshall, the architect of the new Constitution, expounded these doctrines despite the frequent clangor of
protest some of them aroused. His two opinions in the Maryland
and Ohio bank cases 5 reflect a close study of Hamilton's Opinion
on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, and
'For a good discussion of other theories of the nature of the Federal
Union than those of the Federalists, see Charles G. Haines, The Role of the
Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1789-1835, University
of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1944.
2(1821) 6 Wheaton 264, 5 L. Ed. 257.
3(1819) 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
4(1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
5Osborn v. Bank of the United States, (1824) 9 Wheaton 738, 6 L. Ed.
204.
6B. F. Wright, Source Book of American Political Theory, MacMillan,
New York, 1929, p. 294 ff.
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historians of the period can abundantly document the hostility with
which they were received in some State quarters. Others have
pointed out that Marshall, the Federalist, reached different results
from those that Spencer Roane, the Republican, probably would
have reached, had the appointment of Ellsworth's successor fallen
to Jefferson instead of Adams. Be that as it may, these cases (and
others) lend color to the charge made by Jefferson against the
Federalists that they had retreated into the judiciary whence they
could work as sappers and miners to defeat the popular will. The
tracts of such writers as John Taylor of Caroline-his Constritctions- Construed and Constitutions Vindicated is an examplewere evidence of a very lively dissent from the Federalist view
of the Constitution that Marshall was deriving from the "fundamental nature of things" and reading into the law of the land.
The problem of federalism and the Federalist view of the
Constitution were also implicit (in some respects quite dear) in
the several cases involving the contract clause. In the course of
adjudicating these cases, Marshall was able to throw the protection of the Federal Government around certain forms of property
and at the same time assert the paramountcy of Federal power over
that of the States in selected areas. 7 In achieving these objectives,
frequent resort had to be made to a somewhat strained interpretation of language and a selective ignorance of inconvenient facts.
In many of the cases involving the division of power in the new
American federalism, however, Chief Justice Marshall successfully
left vast areas of free decision by future courts. In the cast. of
Gibbons v. Ogden,8 for example, the sort of restraint for the
control of which the Federal Convention was called (note that it
took almost thirty years before the Court got such a case), he
left later courts a broad area within which State actions affecting
interstate commerce could be judged tolerable, without yielding
in the slightest the paramountcy of the Federal interest in the
subject matter.
While Chief Justice Marshall thus sketched the epic design of
the Federal system in Federalist style and color, he guaranteed
his authorship by moving the Federal judiciary into a position in
the Federal Government where it was possible for later judgesas it was for himself-to defeat the popular will in the name of the
people. This was accomplished in.Marbury v. Madison, in an
7
Charles A. Beard, Jefferson, Corporations, and the Constitution, Washington, D. C., 1936, pp. 16-17.
8(1824) 9 Wheaton 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
9(1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.
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argument applicable not only to Congressional statutes but by extension to State leiislation as well. The source of the Constitution,
so the argument runs, is the will of the people. The people ordain
the fundamental law. But a statute also emanates from the people.
In case of a challenge on the grounds of unconstitutionality, the
Court must choose to support the statute or the Constitution. There
lies, therefore, an appeal from the people (statute) to the people
(Constitution). Although put into office by no electorate, the
Supreme Court thus acquired a fictitious constituency which
(through the judges) could out-vote living men and thwart their
purpose as reflected in the statutes. In some instances, he flirtel
with nature and Divinity as the inspiration for the Constitution
but he was too close to the event plausibly to ignore the fifty-five
framers and the convention fights over ratification in Virginia and
New York.
By asserting for the Court the ultimate authority to define the
intent and interpret the will of the fictitious constituency, Chief
Justice Marshall enabled the judges to poll the frequently inscrutable desires of men long departed and mark their ghostly
ballots. Their function became one of searching the words of the
mute to determine their views about matters on which they held
no opinion, for the purpose of blocking the efforts of men alive to
regulate their own affairs. To be sure, the prevailing doctrine of
the day rejected the notion of unlimited power in any organ of
government. The philosophy of the Constitution is too much influenced by Locke to accommodate despotism, whether of popular
majorities or potentates. But the acceptance of ideas of limited
government would not have been incompatible with the view that
the demarcation of these limits must be made by succeeding
generations for themselves, through their elected representatives
or directly.
Fundamental questions about the nature of the Federal union
were temporarily taken out of the hands of the judges by the war
in 1861: national policy was for the time being no longer being
shaped by the law of books but of battles. During the carnage, the
judges in the main, bided their time. While the war was on the
Supreme Court (although sometimes over the protest of minority
judges) avoided embarrassing the Federal Government; it waited
until after Appomattox for exatnple before declaring military trials
unconstitutional when held in a peaceful theater. 10 From time to
time the Court had occasion to observe the spoils of Reconstruction
'VEx parte Milligan (1866), 4 Wallace 2, 18 L. Ed. 281.
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but, throughout, managed to avoid direct judicial intervention, although here too the judges were far from unanimous in their
course.' In sum the Court declined to interfere with the progress
of the war or of Reconstruction, but later subjected the Four-

teenth Amendment to a special (and probably unintended) interpretation that appropriated the guarantees of freedom designed
for former slaves and donated them to men of property.
Although reluctant to meet the issues of the war and Reconstruction frontally, the Court exhibited a strong resolve to restore
the Federal union as nearly to its ante-bellum division as possible
regardless of the intentions of the framers of the new amendments.
Many of the cases after 1865 read lectures upon the need for
national unity and although the paramountcy of the Federal Gov-

ernment was not denied, but indeed vigorously asserted, care was
taken to re-assert the role of the States in the Federal system. But

while consistent in the general statement of principle, the judges
were not unanimous in the shades of emphasis they imported into
their words. A good pair of cases to compare in this respect is
Ex parte Siebold2 and Tarble's Case.'3 The second was written
by a Union Democrat and the first by one of the two 1869 appointees
of President Grant, an ardent Republican. Both of these cases
postulated: the paramountcy of the Federal authority under the
Constitution in the fields of its proper exercise. Both declared that
the American Government was a- federation and not a unitary
system. They differed, however, in the theories of federalism they
expressed, although both were federalistic.
Justice Field's conception was closer to that of Chief Justice
Taney and indeed he cited the latter's opinion in Ableman v.
W 4
Booth
to support the decision of Tarble's Case. Taney had
diminished the carefully fortified Federal authority of Marshall in
no essential respect and indeed had increased and expanded it.1
What he did try to do in addition, however, was to define a proper
sphere of State activity, and in doing so, felt that he was restoring
the intentions of the Framers. His doctrine had no room for the
nullification sentiments of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions,

but he attempted to restate for his generation the basic principles
"See Mississippi v. Johnson, (1867) 4 Wallace 475, 18 L. Ed. 437; and
George v. Stanton, (1867) 6 Wallace 50, 18 L. Ed. 721.
12(1880) 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. Ed. 717.
13(1871) 13 Wallace 397,20 L. Ed. 597.
14(1859) 21 Howard 506, 16 L. Ed. 169.
-SB. F. Wright. The Growth of American Constitutional Law, Boston,

1942, p. 55 ff.
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of the fundamental law. Like Taney, Field regarded the Instrument of 1787 as a division of powers between two authorities of
equal dignity, each empowered to insist that its reserved fields
should not be encroached upon by the other. Under this doctrine
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments become, in effect, limitations
upon the authority of the Federal Government and help to define
its sphere.
The conception of Justice Bradley on the other hand was that
employed by Marshall. Under this conception, the Federal Government defines its own jurisdiction; the Ninth and Tenth Amendments leave to the State governments the residuum of authority that
remains after the Federal sphere has been marked out. The Ninth
and Tenth Amendments do not in themselves constitute limitations
upon Federal authority, and do not reserve areas of activity or
subjects of control into which the Federal Government can never
go under any circumstances.
The Slaughterhouse Cases6 were a sign that the post Civil
War Court was not disposed to tolerate the argument that the war
had wrought any fundamental change in the nature of the Federal
union, however disposed individual judges might be to argue the
refinements of its division. Despite the evident desires of the
Congressional Reconstructionists to retain, by means of the Fourteenth Amendment, the authority to legislate the victory in perpetuity, the Court with appropriate applause for national unity,
nevertheless construed the words of grant into vaporous futility in
the Civil Rights Cases 17 of 1883. The Fourteenth Amendment was

construed to have intended no alteration in the historic relationship between the Federal Government and the States (a doubtful
conclusion), and the Court offered itself to the States as a repository
of the trust that they might not commit to a hostile Congress.
In these dissertations about the nature of the Federal union,
the judges were dealing with profound problems of the basic political organization of the Federal society. Chief Justice Marshall's
task, as he conceived it, was to mark out the sphere for the
Federal Government, to make the master design, the details of
which could be filled in later. The post Civil War Court sought
to maintain the position of the States as entities of the Federal
Union, at a time when an overriding Congress and a victorious
army seemed bent upon distorting what the Court considered to be
an historic relationship, to be restored and perpetuated. President
16(1873) 16 Wallace 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.

17(1883) 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed.835.
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Lincoln had argued that the Union preceded the States and indeed
was responsible for having brought the latter into being, on the
assumption that the people became one in 1776, a view that appealed to Jellinek in Germany which was also faced with the
problem of producing central unity out of the diversity of fragmented political parts. The world extent of the problem of making
political unities out of separatistic localities is evident in the
struggles of Garibaldi, Mazzini, and Cavour to unify Italy, of
Juarez to unify Mexico, and of the Canadians to set up a federation that would heed the lessons of the American experience. This
was done in the British North America Act of 1867 by placing the
reserved powers in the central authority instead of the localities.
The American Civil War in short was one phase of a world
movement in the Nineteenth Century towards republicanism and
unification. The contribution of the Supreme Court was to refuse
to agree that the war had made any basic change in the position
of the States in the American Federal union. In so doing, it exercised political power of considerable influence in a critical moment
of American history.
The re-asserted role of the States in the Federal Union scarcely interrupted the expansion of the Federal Government, however,
especially when the industrial revolution after the Civil War
brought large stale Federal regulation. Some one has remarked that
the United States never goes to the right or the left, but always
expands in the middle. Something of the sort operated in the field
of Federal-State relations; for the growth of governmental activity after the Civil War was less a matter of encroachment by the
Federal Government upon the competences of the States than an
increase of both Federal and State activity. If the expansion of
Federal activities appeared to dominate, it was because the Federal
Government was almost for the first time faced with the necessity
of dealing with a variety of problems requiring uniform national
treatment, for the new business enterprise knew few State loyalties,
and the solicitude of business lawyers for the historic rights of
the States was all too frequently a maneuver to defeat the public
interest. It was a rare case in which the States themselves, through
their public attorneys could assert the need for protection from
the Federal Government. In the usual case, it was a debaters point
between lawyers for private clients to assert that the interest of
the client was not peculiarly his own, but that of the State of his
residence or incorporation.
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In the main, the authentication of the exercise of Federal power
by the Supreme Court was based upon doctrines of the Federal
competence sketched out by Marshall. In this manner did the Court
find the words to certify the approval of the Founding Fathers
for acts of accommodation to the social change which transformed
a sea-board confederation into a world empire, a feat of augury
which was accomplished without the addition of any new substantive
powers to the Federal Government by formal amendment of the
written Constitution. Consider them briefly. The first ten amendments were limitations upon the power of the Federal Government
and so closely associated with the ratification of the Constitution
as to be part of the original document. The Civil War amendments
granted a mere power to enforce the rules which those amendments
prescribed in their texts, for the Thirteenth and Fifteenth amendments were primarily acts of legislation, and only incidentally
grants of power. As indicated, Congress once supposed that it had
been granted affirmative new powers of a radical nature by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but this view was dispelled by the Court.
The Sixteenth Amendment granted no new power but provided for
the exercise of an admitted power in a manner different from that
which the Supreme Court had said was prescribed. The Eighteenth Amendment like the Fifteenth was constitutional legislation, but unlike the Fifteenth it was one that the Congress seriously
tried to enforce. None of these amendments or the later ones
granted any material powers to Congress and of course the Eighteenth was repealed. All of the other amendments involved either
changes in the electoral machinery or in the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts. The judicial glossary on the Constitution rather
than its text has been the mainspring of Federal authority.
Although the Marshall doctrine of federalism prevailed, later
courts never hesitated to summon other theories of the Federal
union than that employed by him to achieve objects that could not
be won without a change of doctrine. For the Court was cheerfully
ambivalent in cases involving what is discussed in the next section
as the priority of the estates. Under the spell of its self-appointed
mission to define and expound the gospel of civil liberty, it occasionally switched from the Marshall formula to something less
hospitable to Federal control. For example, it substituted its version of the Taney-Field conception for the traditional Marshall
doctrine in such cases as the Sugar Monopoly Case of 1895,18 the
'sUnited States v. E. C. Knight Company, (1895)
Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325.

156 U. S. 1, 15 S.
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Child Labor Cases of 191819 and 1919,2 and the agriculture and
coal regulations involved in U. S. v. Butler ' and Carterv. Carter
Coal Company.2- In each of these instances the Court expressed
the view that agricultural and manufacturing production were
subjects of control for the States and not for the Federal Government, although the Constitution nowhere says that any specific
subject matters are exempt from proper and lawful regulation by
the Federal authority. In so finding, the Court gave effect to the
view that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments constituted limitations upon the Federal Government by reason, presumably, of the
protections they threw around subject matters which the Court
said were under the custody of the States.
Now what do these observations on the way in which the
Court has dealt with fundamental political questions of the distribution of power amount to? What of it if the Court has pronounced its views about the fundamental nature of the Federal
Union; does it not have to in the adjudication of cases before it?
The answer to the first of these points is that the Court by reason
of its power to declare acts of legislation unconstitutional does
more than express its views about the nature of the Federal Union,
a right that judges possess in common with all citizens in a democratic society; because of its position, its views acquire a definitive
character from which there is neither recourse nor appeal. The
answer to the second is that the fundamental pattern of the Federal
union could probably have been quite as well preserved without
the Court's power to void State acts unconstitutional, as with it.
This view contradicts the opinion once expressed by Mr. Justice
Holmes that the Court could well afford to yield its power to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress, but that it would
be unfortunate if it lost its power to declare State acts unconstitutional. It is not entirely clear why this should be so, and there
are serious considerations which support a contrary conclusion.
It is doubtful that the Court has been uniquely responsible for
maintaining the basic structure of the American Federal union. As
it has frequently said itself, it has neither the power of the purse
or the sword, and in the only real clashes of authority, as in
President Jackson's dispute with the nullificationists of South
9
-Hammer v. Dadenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed.
1101. 0
- Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, (1922) 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct.
449, 66 L. Ed. 817.
21(1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477.
22(1936) 298 U. S. 238,56 S. Ct 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160.
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Carolina, or President Washington's enforcement of the revenue
laws in the Whiskey Rebellion, and of course the Civil War, the
maintenance of Federal authority in the face of State opposition
has been the function of the President and Congress. But, it may
be said, these are instances of defiance of the Federal authority;
what of the encroachment by the Federal Government into the
domain of the States? Has not the Court performed a service to
the people in maintaining the integrity of the States as entities
of the Federal Union? The answer to this, as to the previous question, is that the elected officials of the Federal Government and
the States have probably been more effective in this respect than
the Court.
The elected officials of the Federal Government come from the
States. There is one whole house of Congress whose basis of organization is the State; a house with coordinate powers in general
legislation, a superior position so far as tenure and prestige are
concerned, and unique powers in the domain of foreign relations
and executive appointment. Such a body may well be trusted to
heed the desires of the States in matters of Federal relationship,
as the experience of recent efforts to enact Federal legislation
against lynching would indicate.
In a democratic society, the basic political questions are for the
people to decide, acting directly or through representatives responsible to them. To vest the authority to decide these basic questions
of the organization and distribution of political power in other officials than those who owe an immediate responsibility to the electorate, is to take out of popular control the making of the important
political decisions. The consequences of these views in evaluating
the Supreme Court as a political institution will be further discussed after considering the Court's treatment of social controls
and the separation of powers.
III
Throughout its life, but with especial force and influence since
the Civil War, the Court has dealt with cases that involve what
may be called the "priority of the estates," those in short, in which
economic groups and interests carry their struggles with each other
into the courts, over issues defined by social controls in the form of
legislation. The Court was quite hospitable to the men of property
and substance and at various stages intervened in their behalf.
This intervention in the social struggle was most persistent from
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the 1880's on when a burgeoning capitalism transformed the economic life of the country, adding enormously to the wealth of the
nation and breeding complex new problems. But although judicial
intervention took new forms after the Civil War, its genealogy
begins at least as early as the retreat of the Federalist Party into
the Federal judiciary in 1801.
What the State courts had been unable to do for the men of
property up to 1787, those men did for themselves in the Constitutional Convention of that year. No need for a Trevett v. Weedon"
when the Constitution itself prohibited the kind of legislation involved in that case. The service which a conservative court could
perform for conservative interests was seen before 1800 (notably
by Hamilton) but it remained for Jolm Adams and John Marshall
to demonstrate how conservative principles could be raised to the
dignity of constitutional precept. Chief Justice Marshall's reading
of the contract clause was a masterpiece of judicial improvisation.
His assumption in Fletcher v. Peck2- that the contract clause of
the Constitution -was intended to apply to contracts in which a
State was party was -without foundation and his conclusion that a
contract was made in the Yazoo scandal was at variance with the
view of the private law about such matters. Fraudulent contracts
are rescindable at the election of either party and the innocent
third persons involved not only had "notice" but in fact rigged tip
the case of Fletcher v. Peck to get precisely the judgment they
received.
By embedding the corporation in the matrix of the contract
clause of the Constitution in the Dartmouth College Case,"5 the
Supreme Court under Marshall created the conditions of growth
most favorable for the budding embryo, to such an extent that it
became the dominant form of business organization. Taney modified the inflexibility of the protection thus afforded in only slight
degree in certain instances, and inno wise endangered the firmness
with which vested corporate rights were anchored in constitutional
doctrine. Commentators who see in the Charles River Bridge Case "
a modification of Marshall by Taney do so without regard for the
actual extension of the contract clause by Taney beyond the point
23 hode Island, 1786, printed in J. B. Thayer, Cases on Constitutional
Law, Cambridge, 1895, vol. I, pp. 55-83, with other early state cases.
24Fetcher v. Peck, (1810) 6 Cranch 87, 3 L. Ed. 162.
2
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, (1819) 4 Wheaton 518, 4 L. Ed.

629. 26

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, (1837)
Ed. 773.

11 Peters 420, 9 L.
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to which Marshall had taken it. In the Ohio Bank Cases, for example and Dodge v. Woolsey,2" Chief Justice Taney continued to
use the contract clause as an armor plate of vested corporate privilege against the efforts of State legislatures by statute and constitutional amendment.to divest these privileges. Indeed the evidence
is that Taney and Marshall exhibit the same ratios in the proportion
of statutes upheld and upset under the contract clause.28
The Civil War released powerful forces in society. A new oligarchy was created. The businessman despised before the war by
such pre-capitalist spirits as Emerson, Melville and Thoreau, after
the war came to dominate the whole life of the country. A new
set of mores was created by the new masters. A new economics
was evolved to rationalize the chance combination of factors in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century which gave to American
industrialism its impetus, character, and vitality. 2" A new jurisprudence was in the making to consolidate the advantages gained.
The revival of doctrines of natural law in the work of the Supreme
Court in this period was essentially the sanctification of the new
oligarchy according to the ancient rituals of the American political
community. In the face of grangerism, greenbackism, populism,
labor organization and corporation-curbing state legislation, the
courts founded the defense of property upon bases more endurable,
more fundamental than even the fundamental law itself. The right
of property was derived from Nature and Nature's God, expressed
in the philosophy of John Locke, and ratified by the American
people in the Declaration of Independence. Reliance on mere manmade constitutions for the justification of social controls was risky
because the greater authority which defined the rights of property
was above mere men.
The rights of men, then, tended to become the rights of men of
property, and this right of men of property took new forms. It
became the right to acquire, rather than the right to hold; for a
new doctrine -was abroad-the doctrine of civil liberty, which in
the Supreme Court, became a right of property. Although, as Parrington has pointed out, the new state of affairs was to have its
confused liberal critics like E. L. Godkin and its confused radical
critics like Brooks Adams, there was a general feeling, shared by
the Supreme Court, that the United States as a nation was on the
27(1856) 18 Howard 331, 15 L. Ed. 401.

28B. F. Wright, Growth of American Constitutional Law, op. cit., pp.
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threshold of great things. Writers as far apart in their methodology
as John William Draper and Orestes A. Brownson could meet in
the common conclusion that America was destined for an important
place in -history now that the question of unionism was out of the
-way. The social order having been ordained by the arbitrament of
force, the destiny of America was to seek the ways how best to
release the individual to achieve his highest potential. Social order
and civil liberty were the twin prescriptions for the success of the
new and revolutionary economics.
Draper's Thwughts on the Future Civil Policy of Anwrica&°
appeared in 1865 and Brownson's Anwrican Republic3' in the
following year. Each asserted that the United States had a mission
to perform, an historical function to serve. This was liberty, a
quality of freedom unknown to the world in its history. For Brownson, it was a greater work than either art or law, the God-given
teleologies of Greece and Rome. It was liberty with law and law
with liberty, "a dialectic union of . . . the natural rights of man
and those of society."32 The liberty cherished by Draper was
liberty of intellect. Freedom of personal actions he felt was already
secured. A nation that owed its material prosperity to the belief
that man could comprehend nature and subjugate her to his use
owed a duty to the world to stand forth as a defender of thought.
For both, civil liberty had a quality of creativeness in it; to use
Santayana's phrase ic was vital, not vacant.
The Supreme Court adopted this new gospel of civil liberty
and adapted it to the materials before it; it made this attractive
political theory the law of the land. Nothing in the black letter of
the written Constitution compelled the Court to write the jural
apologetics that sanctified the new oligarchy; it was entirely a construction of the judges. Liberty of contract and the right to pursue
a lawful calling, as Holmes later observed, were raised to the
solemnity of dogma, although they had started as innocuous generalities. The adjustment of the law of the land to the needs of the
new industrialism took the Court less than two decades; the repudiation of the doctrines of apology took several.
The Court abandoned the contract clause as the prime guarantee
of vested corporate rights and transferred the protection of these
rights to the Fourteenth Amendment. In a series of notable cases.
3

OJotm William Draper, Thoughts on the Future Civil Policy of America,
Harpers,
New York, 1865.
31
Orestes Augustus Brownson, The American Republic, Its Constitution, Tendencies and Destiny, New York, 1866.
32Ibid. p. 5.
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the Court found that there was a overriding power in the States,
the police power, with reference to which all contracts must necessarily be considered to have been made, and to which they must
be assumed to be subordinate in proper cases. The early statements
of the scope of the police power, a judge made doctrine, were
unusually strong because they were made in cases involving the
rights of forms of business enterprise which at the common law
were deemed to be peculiarly subject to regulation. Among these
businesses were gambling, lotteries, and the manufacture and sale
of liquor, and in the cases in which the Court found that contracts
involving such enterprises were subject to the police power, strong
rhetoric was used to describe the nature of this power of selfprotection in the States."3 The language by itself was deceptive,
however; instead of constituting a general grant of power in the
States to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals, the
doctrine of the police power was in essence a limiting doctrine, and
up to the time of Nebbia v. New York 34 in 1934, at least, many
ordinary regulations were required to meet the specifications of
extraordinary justification before the Court would approve them.
The Court transformed the Fourteenth Amendment by making
the due process clause a substantive limitation on State activity.
Like the invention of the doctrine of the police power, this was
without specific warrant in the black letter of the written Constitution. It was not accomplished by one single act of judicial wit and
will for there had been hints of a substantive conception of clue
process before Yick Wo v. Hopkins" and Barbier v. ConnollyA
although in the first extensive case involving the Fourteenth
Amendment the majority had declined to limit the States in this
fashion, and even the minority was not agreed as to which of the
clauses of that Amendment should carry the interpretation.!" The
States, although the repositories of all governmental power not
delegated to the Federal Government were not thereby the possessors of all governmental power, but were also found to be limited
by other restrictions than the flat prohibitions of the Constitution
like the ex post facto, bills of credit, and contract clauses. The
States were thus limited because all government was limited. This
theory of politics has had notable champions, including John Locke,
33See Wynehamer v. People (1856), 13 N. Y. 378, and Boston Beer
Company v. Massachusetts, (1878) 97 U. S. 25.
34(1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
35(1886) 118 U. S. 356,6 S. Ct. 1064. 30 L. Ed. 220.
36(1885) 113 U. S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357. 28 L. Ed. 923.
37Slaughter House Cases, (1873) 16 Wallace 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.
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but it has also had notable dissenters, like Rousseau, who found
the ethical basis of politics in the right of the majority to govern.
Although the Court's design for freedom-the pursuit of lawful
callings-was overlaid with the imputed approval of Nature and
the Divinity by the judges, few of them were as candid as Justice
Brewer when he said that the paternal theory of government was,
to him, odious s The new protection of vested corporate rights
was complete when the Court found, in what seems almost like a
fit of absentmindedness, that corporations were persons within tile
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The consequence of
this finding was to place the corporation behind a protective barricade much more effective than the contract clause. It is not
astonishing that the decline in number of cases under the contract
clause coincides with the adoption of the substantive interpretation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Having decided to regard the due process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as substantive limitations on governmental activity, the'Court then refused to say what these limitations were except in the course of specific cases before it. The
refusal to commit itself and the insisted exposition of the due
process clause by the process of inclusion and exclusion gave the
Court a power to loose and bind that was virtually pontifical. Even
where it was willing to permit certain forms of regulation, it was
frequently chary of justifying them as ordinary exercises of the
police power. Instead, doctrines of extraordinary justification were
devised for such situations. In the regulation of the rates of public
utilities, for exSample, a rate would not be reasonable if those who
fixed it failed to heed the element of reproduction. cost new less
depreciation, although the Court never did say how much weight
should be given to this factor among others. In those enterprises
that were not customarily regarded at common law as public utilities the Court would not tolerate rate fixing as an ordinary exercise
of the police power, but invented the doctrine of affectation with
a public interest, a pure fiction, for the purpose of limiting price
fixing among these enterprises to as few as possible. This doctrine
never had any theoretical coherence or predictive value, and indeed
3

sDissent in Budd v. New York, (1892) 143 U. S. 517, 12 S. Ct. 468,
36 L.39Ed. 247,6 S.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R Co., (1886) 118 U. S. 374,
6 S. Ct. 1132, 30L. Ed. 118.
40B. F. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution, Cambridge,
1938, p. 95.
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the Court was never able to express it clearly. 41 Only occasionally
as in the bank insurance 42 and rent control cases 43 (both by Holmes)
was its artificiality quietly smothered by a simple statement of legislative powers. All forms of price-fixing were virtually anathema to
the judges, including wages regulation which, 4until 1937, ran serious risks in every trip to the Supreme Court.
Under the spell of the dogmas, slogans, and mythology of the
business community, the Court took very seriously its self-appointed role as the guardian of free enterprise. It revived and perpetuated the concepts of a society long past and applied its norms
to conditions that had disappeared or changed. In what Pound has5
characterized as the "belated individualist crusade" of the judges,4
they tended to assume that all individuals were of the same size.
Over-intent upon the technical rules for the relief of individual
defendants from the simpler forms of official duress, the Court
consciously or otherwise contributed to the development of an
economic system characterized by more complicated and not lesseffective forms of duress affecting masses of people.
The new capitalism brought in its train various waves of reform which in one fashion or another bred cases for consideration
by the Court. Grangerism found the Court feeling its way towards
its new political theory and Waite, although reluctant, found sufficient authority for the regulation of grain elevators and railroads
by the States in the Granger Cases of 1877.46 By the 1890's, however, the Court was better prepared and more alarmed; better
prepared with new doctrines of limitation and more alarmed by
popular discontent. The year 1895 was a climax when the Court,
by nullification of the Federal income tax statute, 47 ' the support of
the injunction in the Pullman strike 48 and the protection of the
4
sugar monopoly from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 1
sought, like heroic Perseus, to slay the Gorgon of populism. This
41Wolff Packing Company v. Kansas Industrial Court, (1923) 262 U. S.
522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, was a notable but futile attempt by Chief
Justice2 Taft to provide the desired rationale.
4 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct. 186, 55
L. Ed. 112.
43Block v. Hirsch, (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865.
44See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, (1937) 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578,
81 L.45Ed. 703.
Roscoe Pound, Spirit of the Common Law, Boston, 1925, p. 49.
6
4 Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 94 U. S. 113. 24 L. Ed. 77, and Peik v. C. &
N. W.7 R. Co., (1877) 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. Ed. 97.
4 Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Company, (1895) 157 U. S.
429, 15 S. Ct. 673, 39 L. Ed. 759.
*8In
re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092.
49
Supra. footnote 18.
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gratuitous attempt to defer social retribution and controls was accomplished by tortuous distortions of language and legislative intent and the repudiation (in the income tax case) of the precedents
of a century. The climax of conservative reaction in the Court was
sustained at high pitch for a period of about ten years. From 1895
to 1905, it declared that the Interstate Commerce Commission was
without power to fix rates (even though it had been exercised for a
decade) ;50 wrdte freedom of contract into the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; 51 forced rate-making bodies to
adopt a fantastically difficult method of computation in order to
guarantee a fair return on the fair value of the property invested ;'
and nullified State labor legislation under circumstances which
merited the rebuke of Justice Holmes that Herbert Spencer was
53
more influential in the Couart than the Constitution.
The Square Deal and the New Freedom fared somewhat better
than the populism that preceded them. New judges and the evident
persistence of progressivism to survive at the polls brought about
a change of tactics. The frontal assault represented by the Income
Tax Cases of 1895 was abandoned and the political reforms represented by the initiative and referendum and the direct election of
senators were supported unequivocally, although unnecessary confusion was created in the Newberry Case about the effect of the
Seventeenth Amendment on the direct primary." Efforts to persuade the Court to nullify legislation adopted directly by the voters
without the mediation of a legislature were unavailing.55
Although frontal resistance was, for a time, given up, the more
subtle and devious maneuvers of statutory construction persisted.
The Clayton Act, for example, sought to relieve the position of
labor unions under the Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act,
and received rough treatment at the hands of the judges. Not only
were the labor provisions construed as though no change had been
5OTexas & Pacific R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896)
162 U. S. 197, 16 S. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940, Cinn. N. 0. & Tex. Pac. R. Co.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1896) 162 U. S. 184, 16 S. Ct. 700,
40 L. Ed. 935, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cinn. N. 0. & T. P. R.
Co. (1897) 167 U. S. 479, 17 S. Ct. 896, 42 L. Ed. 243, Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Ala. Midland R. Co., (1897) 168 U. S. 144, 18 S. Ct. 45, 42
L. Ed.
414.
5
1 Algeyer v. Louisiana, (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed.
832.
52Smith v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819.
53
Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed.
937.- 4
5 Newberry v. U. S, (1921) 256 U. S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed. 913.
55Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Company v. Oregon, (1912) 223 U. S. 118.
32 S. Ct. 224, 56 L. Ed. 377.
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intended or made, but the use of the injunction in labor disputes
was broadened, not narrowed. 6 The Federal Trade Commission
which was brought into being by the Clayton Act for the purpose
of defining unfair trade practices was limited by interpretation of
the Court to the prevention of those practices which were unfair
at common law and those which might tend to create monopoly."
With its jurisdiction cramped and the Court looking over its
shoulder, the Federal Trade Commission fulfilled its intended role
as policeman in interstate commerce only with difficulty.
The jural apologetics for free enterprise were not compelled
by any necessary interpretation of the words of the Constitution,
but were written by judges who absorbed the new secular religion
in the period following the Civil War and perpetuated it as the
law of the land. The Court thereby trafficked in theories of politics
that a substantial portion of the country did not entertain, and used
them to defeat the popular will by earnest and frequent recourse to
the fictional constituency of John Marshall. Although the Supreme
Court is sometimes looked upon as a guarantor of civil liberties,
this reputation is only recently won, for until after the middle
1930's, the Court's exegesis on freedom of speech afforded relatively
little room for the exercise of this right by radical critics of the existing order. H. W. Edgerton's review of the cases involving the
guarantee of personal freedom from arbitrary restraint and invasiou
by public authorities clearly indicates the modest compass of the
protection afforded by the Court. 8 The extension of freedom of
speech to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment was,
incidentally, another act of judicial invention, at first in the Gitlow
Case,5 9 by assumption, and then in the Whitney Case,00 by what
seems to have been the application of the doctrine of stare decisis
to the Gitlow Case, an approach to the development of basic political
doctrine reminiscent of the way in which corporations came to be
regarded as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. That the
right of freedom of speech was not a very broad one, at least at the
start, is evident in the Court's early fondness for the limiting con5Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, (1921) 254 U. S. 443,
41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349.
5;Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct.
572, 64
L. Ed. 993.
58
Henry W. Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress,
1937, 22 Cornell Law Quarterly 299.
59
Gitlow v. New York, (1925) 268 U. S. 652, ,45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L.. Ed.
1138.
6oWhitney v. California, (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 .. Ed.
1095.
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cept of "dangerous tendency" as the mete and bound of its legitimate exercise. Granted that a society must protect itself from
destruction, and cannot acquiesce in its own suicide, it must be
admitted that the Court, in the Gitlow and Whitney Cases, was
striking from the temple of the body politic, not a Colt .45, but a
cap pistol.
IV
Roscoe Pound has pointed out that each of the three branches
of the Federal Government has, in successive stages of United
States history exercised domination in the Federal political system.
Before the Civil War, it was the legislature; after the Civil War
it was the judiciary; and more recently, it has been the executive.
The frugal words of the Constitution tell us little about the sepIaration of powers other than to arrange the first
three articles
around the Congress, President, and Supreme Court respectively.
Custom and the Supreme Court have written the glossary. The
fact is, that the subject has never been one of too much concern
to the Supreme Court except where the judiciary was involved,
and its powers, real or fancied, were threatened. It was not until
1935, for example, that a congressional statute was invalidated
because it delegated too much power to the executive.01 Where
the powers of the judiciary have been involved, however, as in
the growth of bureaucracy, the Court has enforced its theories of
politics with a taskmaster's hand.
In two areas, the Supreme Court has tended to mark out fields
of great scope for the executive-war and foreign affairs. It supported Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt in the exercise of wartime
powers that were truly emergency in character and would not have
been tolerated in other than times of war, although the Court m-as
at some pains to assert that war did not justify the exercise of
powers not already vested. 2 In the field of foreign affairs the
tendency has been to find control of our international relations to
be an inherent attribute of the office of chief of state, an approach
to the problem in contrast to the orthodox doctrine that the Federal
Government is one of delegated powers. 63
Like the issues of federalism and the priority of the estates,
61
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the chief problems of checks and balances to face the Court in the
fifty years after the Civil War were rooted in the struggles over
the new industrialism. The same forces which led to the enactment
of various public regulations to delimit the capacity of enterprisers
and to ca-e for the casualties of the economic struggle led to the
creation of commissions and the development of an administrative
law. The justifications for this technique of regulation are too
familiar to be repeated but it may be pointed out that the creation
of administrative tribunals was necessitated by the very ignorance
of sociology and economic fact that enabled the judges to write
such opinions as that of Justice Peckham in Lochner v. New
York.6 4 The judges chose to view expanding bureaucracy as a

challenge to the judiciary; administrative tribunals were an invasion of the ancient prerogatives of the courts. The principle of
the separation of powers was deemed to be in peril.
In certain classes of executive action, the Court was satisfied
to tolerate the exercise of a considerable amount of unreviewed
authority. As early as 1855, for example, it held that due process
was not necessarily judicial process and recognized the need in
some cases for a certain amount of executive self-help. 5 Even
later, the Court could view with equanimity the imposition of fines
by administrative officers where the statute was clear in setting
out the facts upon which the imposition of penalties should depend. 66 Where the simulacra of adjudication were involved, however, the Court was jealous of its powers and scrutinized its presumed executive rival with deep suspicion. The Court could hold
that an administrative officer's findings of facts were binding upon
the courts in cases involving Post Office fraud orders and the deportation of aliens, but not so in cases involving the so-called
quasi-judicial tribunals like the Federal Trade Commission. Justice McReynolds felt bound to point out with some asperity in
the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz"7 that the Federal
Trade Commission was merely the "primary fact-finding body."
The whole plexus of argument and refinement of distinction
involved in the Court's discussions of questions of law and questions
of fact, jurisdictional facts, evidentiary facts, and constitutional
facts, was an effort to protect the historic monopoly of the judges
6
4Supra, footnote 53.
65

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, (1856)
18 Howard 272, 15 L. Ed. 372.
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to "try" cases. Post Office, Department of the Interior, Customs,
and Immigration officials were permitted to determine and fix the
,rights of individuals before them without provoking the concern
of the Courts so long as they did not pretend that they were acting
in place of the courts, but in the commission form of regulation, the
Court steadfastly set its face against the wielding of the juridical
symbols by any but the members of the ancient craft. In case after
case, especially in the rate-making process, it substituted its conception of the facts for that of the men appointed for their expertness in the facts. Under the guise of finding admixtures of law and
fact it brought within the province of judicial scrutiny, the entire
process of administrative adjudication. The professional clergy was
harsh on the lay preachers in the faith, refracting their works according to the triune division of powers, although it was clear that
each of them contained within itself executive and legislative authority as well as judicial.
The struggle over the priority of the estates was in essence a
struggle over the power to make the important economic decisions
in the American community. Just as the Court frequently refused
to permit legislatures to make these decisions, so did it refuse to
permit the administrative tribunals to do so even when the basic
legislation bore the approval of the Court. Here, however, the
nature of the intervention was confused with the interest that the
Court had in overseeing .the activities of those it regarded as rivals
in the observance of judicial forms and procedures. One interest
tended to support the others: free enterprise was inherently desirable and interference with it by executive authority was undesirable-in addition, many forms of executive action were undesirable
because they tended to overshadow the judiciary. The political
doctrine of the separation of powers thus became an instrument of
laissez faire, another political doctrine, and by its exposition of
both, the Supreme Court deferred the time when, and increased
the difficulty by which the people through its representatives in
the legislatures and the executive seats could come to terms with
the n.eeds of that portion of the economic community that could
not protect itself by self-help.
V
As one of the principal holders of public power, the Supreme
Court in the general areas of political theory commented upon has
frequently professed the doctrines and bespoken the interests of
minority groups; the Federalists with their gospel of strong central
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power and liberal interpretation; the defeated States of the South
after the Civil War; the acquisitive minorities bred by the industrial revolution; and the judicial bureaucracy. The imputed views
of the fictitious multitude of the -\'arbury Case, represented by
judges, have bound the struggles of the living to move from one
precarious social balance to another. One comment has summarized
the political activity of the Court in the following words :08
"It is at once a judicial and a political body. It is judicial in
that its usages are of a court of law. . . .It is political in that its
orders extend far beyond the individuals immediately involved; it
fixes conditions and sets bounds about the resort to law; it revises
the pattern of the separation of powers among the agencies of government; it endows with intent, discovers latent meaning and resolves conflicts between legislative acts; it invokes Constitution,
statute, its own decisions to hold Congress, department, administrative body in its place. Even when it imposes self-denial upon itself,
politically it extends the frontiers of some other agency of control.
Judgments along these lines are political, not legal, decisions. Issues
of due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities are
questions of the limits of the province of government. . . ." The
Court, in short, has exercised a political power of the highest influence; and although subject to the chance of the docket and able
only to function interstitially, as Holmes remarked, nevertheless
it has been in a strategic position to cast its weight this way and
that when the balance could be tipped.
In what may be thought of as the "Bloody Assizes of 1935-6,"
the Court attempted to save the country from the New Deal, as it
had once sought to preserve it from populism. A climax was reached
in 1937 when, under an aggressive pressure of opinion, the Court
yielded to reforms long overdue. For it was the "Old Deal" Court
that led the way with the cases of National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation8 and West Coast Hotel
70
v. Parrish.
The effect of this recantation is not done; the current court's opinions show an evident desire to retire, for the time
being, from the invention and exposition of juristic theories of
politics, or at least of the kind opposed to the popular view. But
this change must be viewed skeptically. As has been said, "The
paths of retreat from policy making are not yet beaten. Nor do
68
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9(1937) 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893.
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they all move in a single direction. Now and then a trail, by a
circuitous route, leads back to the political front. It may prove to
be the rule-as it is already evident in the instance-that the liberty
accorded executive and legislature is postulated upon an expectation of good behavior."'
Now, if it be admitted as a postulate of democracy that all holders of political power should be responsible to the people in some
regular and effective way for the exercise of that power, it would
seem that the Supreme Court as a political institution should similarly be made responsible for the exercise of political powers-so
long as it continues to do so. Assuming that it continues to do so,
how then do we make judges responsible to the people? An obvious
reply would be: election of judges by ballot; and in support, it
could be pointed out that direct election of judges in the States is
no novelty. Indeed, in New York State the justices of the
Court of Appeals are elected, and enjoy an admirable reputation
throughout the country, having set marks of professional esteem
usually withheld from the lower magistracy who are appointed
officers. Differentials of pay and power help to maintain the differential competence, reputation and prestige between these two
judicial levels naturally, but it is clear that appointment alone cannot guarantee nor election prevent the recruitment of judges of
highest professional skill. And it would not be difficult to make a
persuasive case for the election of the justices of the United States
Supreme Court, perhaps even more easily than for the State judges,
from whose courts appeals to" the highest Federal tribunal proceed; for the political decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States affect the basic distribution of powers in the entire American community.
However, it would be difficult to achieve a system of direct
election of the Supreme Court although the direct election of judges
is as familiar now as it was a century ago, because in the interval
the cult of the Constitution and the mythology of the judges have
become imbedded in'the American political tradition. The influence of lawyers in our public life has been conspicuous since
DeTocqueville, at least. As a people, we have a quality of legalism
in our national habits perhaps not equalled in any other country,
and our great political debates have frequently been disputations
akin to lawyer's wrangles. A fairly recent instance of this legalism
was the sense of betrayal evident in some newspapers and political
7"Walton and Braden, op. cit., p. 1369.
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speeches when it was discovered that the Atlantic Charter was not
a written text to be expounded. As a verbal understanding, it wasn't
worth the paper it was written on, to paraphrase the well known
jest. Moreover, our political philosophy has usually been couched
in the forms of legal debate: consider for example the main question of the American Revolution-whether we were to have the
"rights" of Englishmen in the colonies. It was only in the latest
phase that we began to argue with Paine about the rights of man in
a free society. This propensity to legalism and a general distrust of
government have helped to maintain the cult of the Constitution
in which the written document is regarded as the source from which
right principles can be drawn for the guidance of men in their
everyday affairs despite the fact that the words are all too general
and the meaning must be found in the deed.
Along with the cult of the Constitution flourish the companion
myths about the judiciary, which is often looked upon as a group of
wise men aloof from the storms and stresses of will and emotion
that beset other people. It is thought somehow to be profane to
think that they wear trousers beneath their judicial robes and that
they should be subjected like other officers of the government to
that periodic scrutiny of their records by which a people keeps itself free in a democracy. Popular election of the judges of the
Supreme Court is likely to be the most remote kind of event, then.
It would be as difficult to imagine the popular election of the dogmatic clergy although, to be sure, some denominations have succeeded in combining responsiveness to the congregation with respect for the cloth.
A second possibility is the recall of judicial decisions by legislative action. This course also assumes the continued intervention of
the Supreme Court in matters of political concern. This possibility
meets the same compunction and inchoate resistance as the direct
election of judges and for substantially the same reasons. And yet,
if it be felt that the judges in matters of constitutional construction (i.e. political doctrine) under a procedure for the recall of
decisions, would be subject to the "whims" of a legislature, it can
be replied that juristic theories of politics subject the legislature
to the whims of the judges. If any body has superior claim to the
ultimate word in matters of political doctrine it should perhaps be
the legislature, which can be made responsible directly for its
acts. It is not enough either to employ the ancient argument of
Chief Justice Marshall that the judges take an oath to support
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the Constitution and they must perforce expound and enforce it
as they understand it, else they will be in violation of their oaths.
The legislatures and the executive are also bound to enforce the
Constitution as they understand it, and it has never been thought
to be inconsistent with this obligation for the judges to have the
last and final decision about constitutional meanings. An official
who honestly votes his understanding of the Constitution has
fully discharged his oath, even if he be overruled in the matter.
This has always been true when judges overruled legislatures; it
should be equally true if legislatures overrule judges.
Neither of these two possibilities is probably available yet as a
course of action for makirig justices responsible for their political
doctrines. Clemenceau is supposed once to have said that war is too
serious and important to be left to generals. With equal cogency
it can be said that the basic political decisions about the American
society are too serious and important to be left to the judges. The
only recourse that lies at present is the self denial of the justices
themselves. Some would regret a complete abdication of the Court
from the field of political doctrine on the ground that the country
would lose something of a stabilizing influence. And yet it is
difficult to appreciate the merit of this view when it is recalled
how unstabilizing the Court has been in'rate-making for example,
or intergovernmental taxation, or in multiple taxation. So long
as presidents continue to appoint members of their own party, as
they have in the past, an oblique and indirect kind of responsiveness, sometimes long delayed, and always circuitous will operate.
This is indeed a roundabout way however, and only Providence
can guarantee that presidents will have an opportunity to express
the desires of the electorate in the judiciary, and then only rarely
is it that a Jackson, Lincoln, Taft, or Roosevelt has an opportunity
to appoint a new court majority.
As was said at the outset, each generation defines the basic
constitution of the public power for itself, and the political apparatus
gives effect to this decision. As part of this political apparatus, the
justices eventually too have come to give effect to these decisions,
but the lag is sometimes long and always delayed. With respect
to politics and policy, the Court is now in a quiescent phase, but
its license to oversee "the commonwealth and the economy" is not
revoked, but merely suspended by its own action. Whether the
suspension is sometime made irrevocable remains to be seen.

